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   ON THE SACRED AND 
     THE PROFANE 
                 Reimon Bachika 
   The paired up terms of sacred and profane constitute a twin con-
cept we are likely to encounter in not a few studies in the sociology 
of religion. Implying an opposition between a certain qualification of 
religiosity and its absence, this double concept will reflect the user's 
conception of religion revealing  „a certain degree" of opposition or 
another way of relationship between the two implied aspects. In other 
words, its particular use will reflect how religion is seen to extend 
into the field of everyday reality, how both religion and everyday re-
ality relate to each other. This evidently is an important theological 
and sociological question. 
 In the following, then, I will review how this pair concept is treat-
ed in some literature on religion and discuss or comment mainly on 
its sociological bearings. Especially we will see how it is utilized by 
Durkheim, Malinowski and Eliade to all of whom it is of central con-
cern. Let us start with Durkheim. 
               Emile Durkheim 
   Durkheim's monograph on primitive religion is a very extensive 
study aiming at the high goal of nothing less than discovering the 
origin of religion and delineating its final meaning. Durkheim wants 
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to reach this goal, first, by pinpointing the elementary forms or the 
common elements  of all religious life and, second, by investigating 
the circumstances in which these elements come into being . This will 
allow him to discover the sources and causes of their beginning from 
which their ultimate meaning can be deducted. The easiest way to re-
alize this objective, Durkheim asserts, is to study the most primitive 
religion, where the distance between cause and effect is easier to 
cover than in the case of differentiated, historical  religionsi) . 
   After having discarded the views that religion cannot be primarily 
concerned with the ideas of the supernatural or with beliefs in spiri-
tual beings, Durkheim establishes a preliminary definition of religion . 
Religion consists, he says, of two fundamental categories , beliefs and 
rites, in order words, states of mind and specific ways of behavior . 
Because it is beliefs that determine the objective of the practices , beliefs 
have to be defined first. It is mentioned that one , common charac-
teristic of all beliefs is that they assume a classification of all things , 
real and spiritual into two opposed categories : the profane and the 
sacred. Beliefs as expressed in myths and the like are also important 
for other reasons. They determine not only what objects will be con-
sidered as sacred, but also the specific nature, characteristics, virtues 
etc., of these  objects2). 
   The nature of sacred things is rather complex. All sacred things, 
not all of the same quality, are thought to be superior to things pro-
fane and radically opposed to the latter. Most sacred are the totemic ani-
mals and plants, also the churinga, which are objects made from wood 
or stone into which figures are carved or engraved, representing the 
totemic animal or plant. Every clan named after a totem, has its own 
churinga or even a collection of such sacred emblems. They are kept 
in a sacred place and are the center of religious ceremonies . The 
word churinga itself means  „sacred". It is in connection with the re-
ligious character of  these objects that all things are classified as  sacred 
and profane (p.  167). 
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    The radical opposition between the sacred and the profane is re-
 vealed in the cult and in other experiences with various sacred things 
 in daily life. The cult itself is of a double nature, positive and  nega-
tive3), says Durkheim. The positive part of the cult, found in the tri-
bal ceremonies and held at the sacred places, is of a sacrificial kind, 
featuring mainly the ritual consumation of the totemic animal or plant. 
More important for the understanding of the sacred, however, is the 
negative cult, a body of prohibitions and taboos intended to ascertain 
the separation between the sacred and the profane—sacred things, 
according to Durkheim, are by definition separated from others—There 
is prohibition of physical contact, for instance, eating and watching 
the totem, also talking about it in daily, profane circumstances. These 
rules, however, are not absolute. They do not apply after purification 
or during celebrations. Also, they are different for the various categories 
of people, men, women, initiated, etc. This difference is explained by 
the belief that people partake in the sacredness of the totem but not 
all in the same way. 
   The reason for the separation of both realities is found in the 
fluidity or contagiousness of the sacred objects. Sacredness is apt to 
diffuse, because it is a kind of energy that has penetrated the objects 
from the outside and may leave them again. 
   A related characteristic is the ambiguousness of the sacred which 
is recorded especially in the case of funeral rites and other public 
expiatory  ceremonies4). That is, the religious forces are of a double 
nature, pure or impure. They may be benefactory or dangerous and 
harmful. Though both are object of separation vis-a-vis profane things , 
and though at the same time antagonistic to each other, they are in 
some way related. They are even reversible in many cases. For exam-
ple, the totemic animal is the most sacred being but it will cause death 
when eaten except in religious ceremonies. Also, human corpses are 
treated with fear. They are object of avoidance at first when death 
has occurred. Later they become the object of respect and veneration. 
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Many similar examples show the ambiguity of the sacred, which means 
after all that both pure and impure kinds have the same nature. 
   The two main sociological problems of totemism, and indeed of 
all religion, according to Durkheim, are to explain what human forces 
have been able to inspire those strong religious sentiments, and to 
explain what has caused man to see two heterogeneous and incom-
patible worlds as the sacred and the profane where nothing in com-
mon experience seems to suggest this radical  duality°. Durkheim 
relates these two problematic aspects respectively to the social func-
tions of totemism and its religious  significance°. 
    Concerning the social function of totemism Durkheim argues that 
the use of names, emblems, in other words, the extensive use of sym-
bolism is a necessary condition for the viability of social life. The 
totem and its symbolism also have an important cognitive function in 
relating man to nature and inculcating that awareness. The yielded 
knowledge does not differ fundamentally from scientific thought. Any 
explanation of any phenomenon even today has to concentrate on 
the relationships of the various elements of the reality that is to be 
explained. In relating animals and plants to the human society, primi-
tive people only have combined what we would separate and vice-
versa. In their social system they have integrated elements from nature, 
and in their view of nature they made enter human elements. Reli-
gion, in this way, as a system of social and religious thought, has been 
the beginning of science and philosophy. However, Durkheim conti-
nues. religion has been able to play this role because of its social and 
collective nature. In order to create a world of ideas by which the 
 world of observed realities appeared to be transformed, an over-stimula-
tion of intellectual forces was needed. This is possible only in and 
 through society (p. 340). It is this intellectual over-stimulation or effer-
 vescence that lies at the origin of religion, which, together with the 
 moral authority of society is responsible for arousing those strong 
 religious sentiments. 
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   Durkheim's argumentation concerning the religious function of 
totemism is basically the same. He explains how the natives in their 
ritual behavior identify with their totem by imitating its way of being 
or behavior. These ceremonial performances are intended to ascertain 
the reproduction of the totem, because it is believed that the fertility 
of the totem needs the help of man. Man's existence, in turn, depends 
on that fertility. Durkheim, then, explains the way of thinking behind 
the totemic practices as a primitive understanding of the principle 
of causality, which can be summarized in the proposition that "the 
similar produces the similar". 
 This way of thinking, according to Durkheim, is clearly dominated 
by the social conditions of primitive existence, ultimately by the moral 
authority of the group. For Durkheim, again, it is social forces that 
are at work, rather than religious forces. He, therefore, can reduce 
religion to the workings of society. This is Durkheim's main conten-
tion concerning religion. 
   An early example of how Durkheim short-circuits the social and 
religious sphere is found in his deduction of the totemic principle, 
mana, from the functioning of  society'). The social origin of the 
mana-energy is a conclusion from the insignificance of the totemic 
animal or plant and its representati  3ns. Because they are insignificant, 
they cannot be the real object of the cult. The object of veneration 
is the common principle that is present in the mediums. It is some 
kind of impersonal, anonymous force, some kind of energy that has 
been trapped in all those heterogeneous objects and beings. How is 
this energy experienced and where does it come from? Sometimes it 
is thought of by the natives as a physical force, but to Durkheim its 
moral character is much more in evidence. He relates it e. g., to 
the fact that the natives strictly observe their religious practices be-
cause of their obligation to their ancestors. Finally, society is  deducti-
vely established as the ultimate source of mana: because the totem, 
as the symbol of society, is at the same time the incarnation of the 
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impersonal mana, the totemic principle can be nothing but the clan 
that hypostatizes itself in it. 
   From our summary of Durkheim's argumentation it will be clear 
that his rallying point is the explanation of the human forces that 
are responsible for religion in general and for the opposition of the 
sacred and the profane in particular. Those human forces, Durkheim 
concluded, are social forces, whether they are related either to the 
religious functions or to the social functions of totemism. If Durk-
heim's study implied only propositions like this, most people would 
agree with him especally in our present  'time. Indeed, it can be said 
that, for instance, it has become a truism in sociology that religion 
has been possible in and through society. It only amounts to the sta-
tement that religion is a social phenomenon. However, this is still far 
removed from saying that all religious meanings can be reduced to 
social significance. In other words, the meaning of the sacred and 
the profane remains a problem as well as their elationship. But, 
before engaging in more personal comments, I will look for some 
other sources of critique towards Durkheim and further discussion of 
our subject matter. 
             Bronislaw Malinowski 
   Malinowski's criticism of  Durkheim8) concerns, first, the latter's 
disregard of the individual aspects of religion. According to Malinow-
ski, it is rather to individual consciousness in solitude that the strong-
est religious feelings should be ascribed. Also, individual and personal 
beliefs, rather than fear of social sanctions lie at the ground of the 
primitives' observances of morals and taboos, much the same as in 
the case of people in modern societies. However, even if Malinowski 
is right is stating that the forces of individual minds should not 
be overlooked, it should also not be forgotten that morals and taboos 
come about socially and that individual minds begin to function after 
 —  164  —
                    ON THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE 
socialization has done its work, after the individuals have internalized 
moral and religious beliefs. Individual consciousness and observances 
of moral rules, then, cannot be disconnected from the social sphere. 
   Second, a more convincing argument brought up by Malinowski 
against  Durkheim is that the latter mainly studied the seasonal cere-
monies of the primitives and much less other forms of collective life. 
Collective effervescence or heightening of emotions also occurs in pro-
fane events such as battles, sailing regatta, tribal gatherings for trad-
ing purposes etc. Yet, no religion is generated on any of these occa-
sions. Consequently, it may be more correct to say that Durkheim, in-
spite of concentrating too much on religious events by overlooking 
other social activities, by the same token understimated religious events 
by over-emphasizing their social meaning. Anyway, problematic is 
Durkheim's argumentation about the relationship of the religious and 
the non-religious sphere. Durkheim's solution was one of combination 
and finally of reducing the meaning of the former to that of the latter. 
Malinowski's view, in contrast, is rather one of separation. 
   Based on his own fieldwork among the Papuo-Melanesian tribes 
of Eastern New Guinea, Malinowski is able to demonstrate that the 
natives clearly distinguish between profane work and magic  activities9). 
He reports that many islanders rely on gardening for their subsis-
tence and that they manage successfully. The reasons for their success 
are, except favorable climatological conditions, their careful work and 
extensive knowledge about the soil, the cultivated plants and other 
natural conditions. A similar situation is reported in connection with 
other activities such as fishing, warfare, care for health and so on. 
However, appart from their knowledge and work, they also rely on 
magic practices in most of their activities. A different efficacity is 
attributed to the latter as can be understood from the fact that the 
natives never substitute magic for work. 
   In the domain of the  sacredm, religious and magic activities are 
distinguished. First, religious creeds and attitudes are found to be 
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centered around the most important events and crises of the life 
cycle: pregnancy, birth, initiation, rites of marriage and death. Cere-
monies and celebrations in these cases are performed with no particu-
lar purpose, except that they are traditional activities, which have 
several creative functions for the group as well as for the individuals. 
They establish, fix and reinforce social life and tradition; they sacra-
lize the crucial moments of individual existence by shaping and enhan-
cing its mental attitudes. For example, the initiation ceremony is the 
occasion of systematic instruction combined with dramatic ritual. It 
results in spiritual metamorphosis of the young men who from now 
on will be able to see themselves as different persons, with new duties 
and privileges, with a new knowledge of tradition and the communion 
with the sacred beings. Though very different, a similar creative func-
tion is realized by the rites for the departed, which counteract the 
devastating effect of death at the personal and the collective level. 
These rites, also, may support or attribute greater significance to in-
dividual and social life by inspiring and enhancing the belief in its 
continuation in another world. All in all, religious ceremonies are not 
a means to an end, they rather contain their end in their very per-
formance. 
   Second, magic is a practical art or a pseudo science, consisting of 
acts which are only a means to definite results expected to follow 
later on. Malinowski finds three elements in magic : A spell, a rite 
and a series of strict conditions in relation to the performer . He rejects 
the idea that magic is born from the abstract conception of a uni-
versal power like mana that some scholars conceive of as a physical 
force while others see it rather as a supernatural one . Like religion, 
magic is based on mythological tradition. It also finds its origin in a 
situational stress, more in particular, it is an emotional reaction on 
the awareness of impotence in practical activities. Magic as a whole 
is characterized as: a strong emotional experience, which spends itself in 
a purely subjective flow of images, words, and acts of behavior , leaves a 
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very deep conviction of its reality as if of some practical and positive 
achievement, as if of something done by a power revealed to man. In 
a word, it is the sublime folly of hope (p. 81). 
   Malinowski's description of the natives' profane and religious life 
seems to be a model of  idges claires et distinctes. Referring continuous-
ly in concrete terms to their society, he presents us with an unambi-
guous picture of profane activities, magic, religion and scientific atti-
tudes. In contrast to Durkheim, Malinowski delineates religion as a 
special sphere of specific attitudes and activities with a definite mean-
ing of its own, not detectable in other activities. Religion is not sepa-
rated from magic, but it is clearly distinguishable from it. Malinowski 
is not interested in defining religion in connection with a narrow 
matter (e. g., spirit worship, ancestor cult, the cult of nature etc.), 
because it may include many things. He sees religion mainly in 
connection with the vital interests of life. It is in this area that its 
meaning and its functions must be looked for. 
   Agreeing in principle with Malinowski's vitalistic view of religion, 
I would like to venture, however, at least one reservation in connec-
tion with the articulation of the different areas of activity Malinowski 
has outlined so well, almost up to the point of sealing them off from 
one  anotherm. How magic and religion result from the complexities 
of life and from man's effort to overcome his inadequacy and his 
crises, all this is well illustrated, but how these areas of the profane, 
magic and religion do exist side by side, or how they are integrated 
into one system is not touched upon. In his discussion of profane 
work and magic, for instance, Malinowski concludes that the attempts 
at efficiency through work and knowledge are the dominant tenden-
cies. These tendencies are signs of a scientific way of thinking that 
in itself is not different from the one in advanced science. They con-
stitute what he calls the profane sphere, which is different from the 
religious one. As we can see: their relationship remains an unsolved 
question. 
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    Next, we will turn our attention to Eliade, historian of religion, 
who treated the matter extensively in his book The Sacred and the 
Profane. Although Eliade's view of the relationship of the sacred and 
the profane resembles that of Durkheim, he  provides us with some 
different aspects of the problem, especially because he treats it in 
connection with various religions, ancient and modern. 
                 Mercea Eliade 
   The meaning that Eliade attributes to the sacred is largely tra-
ceable to Christian theology. He begins his  study") by referring to 
Otto's conception of the sacred, but he proposes to investigate it, not 
only in so far as it is irrational, as Otto had done, but in all its com-
plexity (p.  10). Eliade, in this way, seems to pledge continuity with 
Otto, but actually his approach is rather different. Otto studied religi-
ous experience, i. e., man's religious feelings towards the Holy as 
found in the Bible and other sacred texts. He came to characterize 
the numinous as an awe-inspiring, fascinating mystery. Eliade, on the 
other hand, is not at all concerned with a description of the Holy it-
self, but with its "revelation" in nature. He is also concerned with 
the "perceptions" of things as sacred or profane by religious or non-
religious people — It may be remarked that the latter perceptions are 
much less important to religious experience than the perceptions of 
the Holy itself — In other words, Eliade mainly discusses various cross-
cultural religious meanings that have been attributed to space, time, to 
nature and human life in some of its physiological functions (e. g., the 
body itself, eating and sex) and social manifestations and activities 
(e. g., sanctification of dwellings, initiation rites, belonging to men's 
or women's groups etc.) 
   Two lines of description are interwoven as already suggested. 
First, the sacred is represented as factually revealing itself to man 
in a Christian-theological fashion, as may be seen especially from the 
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much used term hierophany, something sacred manifesting itself (p. 
11). In other words, an identical meaning is found in manifestations 
of the sacred in things, for instance, in a rock or a tree, as well as 
in the supreme hierophany which occurred in the incarnation of God 
in Jesus Christ. It is called a paradox that, although the sacred is 
thought to be totally different from the profane, there is no solution 
of continuity in any hierophany, because there is the manifestation of 
something of a wholly different  order...in objects that are an integral 
part of our natural "profane" world (p.  11). Shortly, we will return 
to this way of presentation. 
   A second line of description is that of religious experience, more 
specifically of the religious or non-religious orientations of man. Things 
in nature and in life are capable of being experienced in a merely 
material or natural way, but also, as things participating or revealing 
cosmic sacrality. As a consequence, there are two modes of existence, 
the religious and the non-religious one, which are separated by the 
abyss of the sacred and the profane (p.  14). In other words, the sacred 
and the profane are two existential situations assumed by man in the 
course of his history. Later, Eliade will expose the view that the sa-
cred or religious way of life has prevailed from the beginning through-
out the greatest part of man's history and that the profane way is a 
recent development. 
  As the characteristics of the sacred and the profane are concerned, 
we have encountered two in our summary so far, which earn Eliade 
companionship with Durkheim. They are, firstly, of course, the oppo-
sition of the two aspects, the illustration and definition of which 
Eliade proclaims to be the very aim of his study, and secondly, their 
continuity. Otherwise, Eliade's presentation is quite different, as com-
pared with Durkheim's and also Malinowski's. Therefore, we will en-
counter different problems we would like to comment upon, because 
they are not unrelated to the conception of the sacred and the profane. 
   To begin with, a methodological problem seems to be involved 
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in the alternation of the two lines of description, which is already 
felt in the very broad use of the term "sacred". It is used to indi-
cate not only the sacred quality that is perceived in things by religi-
ous people, but also to refer to all religious ways of life. The problem 
with the alternation of different descriptions is that the aspect of re-
velation is a theological perspective  and that it seems to be inferred 
as part of the explanation. Concretely, the sacred reveals itself as be-
ing of a totally different nature as its mediums. This was also Otto's 
inferrence concerning the Holy, but it is actually a theological state-
ment and object of belief, which cannot be verified. It corresponds 
closely to the Christian conception of the transcendence of God. 
   Further, Eliade, as already mentioned, treats all the manifestations 
of the sacred, whether in primitive or modern religion, whether ori-
ental or western, as one single  category opposed to a similarly homo-
geneous treatment of the profane in all cultural circumstances. This 
makes one wonder about the value of those concepts of the sacred 
and the profane, especially if they are interpreted in a Christian  way, 
If Eliade's view of man's religiosity is backed only by Christian theo-
logical thinking, it can only have value as such, not as an empirical 
generalization we are entitled to expect from any empirical discipline, 
whether historical or sociological. In order to check on this aspect 
more carefully, let us follow Eliade's argumentation concerning religi-
ous and non-religious experiences of space and  time13). 
   Concerning space, Eliade states that its experience is homogeneous 
for non-religious man and heterogeneous for religiously oriented people. 
The revelation of a sacred space makes it possible to obtain a  fixed 
point and hence to acquire orientation in the chaos of homogeneity (p. 
 23). One conclusion is that : The World becomes apprehensible as 
world, as cosmos, in the measure in which it reveals itself as a sacred 
world (p.  64)  . Except that here again revelation and experience go 
hand in hand, we cannot but remark that religious man, according 
to Eliade, experiences only some places as sacred and others as  pro-
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fane, while Eliade states elswhere that all nature is capable of reveal-
ing itself as cosmic sacrality (p. 12) and that the whole of life is capa-
ble of being sanctified. (p.167) How this "division of awareness" works , 
is not explained. A double arbitrareness seems to be involved between 
the principle of the general possibility of sacrality in all nature and, 
on the one hand, its partial experience (only some space is experien-
ced as sacred), and  on the other hand, its result at least if we take 
at face value the statement that "experience of sacred space makes 
possible experience of profane space". 
    Time is experienced similarly but the situation is more complex. 
As in the case of space, it is the introduction of sacred time that 
makes possible the other time, ordinary time, the profane duration in 
which every human life takes its course (p.  89). However, sacred time 
is not all of the same quality. There is mythological and historical 
time. The former is sacred time periodically reactualized in pre-Chris-
tian religions. It is primordial, original and not preceded by any other 
time. The latter, historical time, is a mutation originating in the affir-
mation of the historicity of the person of Jesus Christ. However, in 
non-religious time more heterogeneity is allowed for than in the case 
of the experience of space. Also, for non-religious man varying tem-
poral rhyhms are recorded in work, celebrations, while listening to 
music, when being bored etc. But after all, non-religious time cannot 
present neither break nor mystery. 
   What Eliade's argumentation amounts to is the statement that, 
basically, there are two opposing orientations of the mind, a sacred 
and a prolane one. This is illustrated by many examples in relation 
to the various conceptions of man's existence in nature and in society. 
These expamples are taken from many religions, primitive and modern. 
Because the concepts about space, time etc, are not central to religion, 
Eliade's study bears more on culture than on religion itself, as was 
announced in the subtitle of the book, and as we find in his asser-
tion that culture from the beginning of human history has been 
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religious and still remains so today, though many people are not aware 
of its religious origin. This view is reminiscent of Durkheim's, as 
we find expressed toward the end of his study on  religion14). 
   The fact that the concept of  „sacred-profane" is used in a context 
of culture will diminish its utility in connection with religion itself, 
especially because Eliade attributes to it a certain Christian interpre-
tation as mentioned above. To focus more precisely on this  issue what 
is the cognitive or evaluative value of such a concept? What does it 
convey about Christianity, Buddhism, Islam or any other religion? It 
only conveys that those religions nurse some kind of sacral awareness, 
which is not much more than a tautology, an affirmation to the extent 
that these religions are religious. The specific, sacral awareness of 
any religion can only be known by studying the concrete case. 
    From the preceeding can be concluded that, even if there exists 
an oppostion between sacred and profane, it can only exist within a 
concrete religion, within its believers. 
    I would like to argue that the opposition between the sacred and 
the profane is only one manifestation of religious awareness, and that 
many different religious orientations do exist. To mention some by 
way of example, there is the basic belief of Christianity in the good-
ness of all "creation", or the belief that all creation reflects Gods 
power and  majesty15). We also can mention a similar belief usually 
held in Catholic convent life, that a religious value can be attributed 
to all activity, provided it does not violate religious commandements. 
There is also the view in Calvinism, famous since Weber's The Protes-
tant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, that the glory of God can, 
and has to be achieved through work in society (inner-worldly  asce-
tism). In connection with Buddhism, mention can be made of the be-
lief in the Hinayana traditon of the sacredness of all animal life. In 
 Mahayana there are trends and endeavors to integrate or transcend 
 the for Western thinking fundamental opposition between the good 
 and the bad, etc. All these examples show that the realm of the sacred 
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is quite different in the various religions. As may be easily remarked, 
the perspective in all the examples is not reified religion as it may 
be thought to exist in culture, but that of religious action and indivi-
dualized awareness. Consequently the relationship of the sacred and 
the profane, or better, of sacred and profane awareness is different 
in every case. This means that the concept of the sacred and the 
profane as thought of by Durkheim, Malinowski and Eliade, is certain-
ly not universally applicable. It is a rather ambiguous concept in need 
of redifinition or elimination. 
           Toward an Alternative View 
   When looking toward an alternative view of the matter, it is not 
unimportant to ask the question why, after all, religion has been con-
ceived of as the realm of the sacred and everyday life as that of the 
profane. Without being able to investigate the question very carefully, 
I would like  t  o venture some suggestions. 
   A latent reason probably lies in the division of labor and in the 
tendency of religious activities to differentiate into a world of their 
own. Because of the relationship with the mysterious, and because 
efficience and rationalization is not much of a problem as it is in the 
rest of life, religion is apt to fix ways of behavior, ritual zing and 
sacralizing them, making implements of worship exclusive to its use 
and so on. Conservatism in religion is a much know tendency. 
   A. Jensen has pointed this out for primitive  religion16). Here, ac-
cording to him, tradition itself mostly functions as motivation for re-
ligious behavior. If the natives are asked why they have such and 
such a fertility cult, why they knock out incisors at initiation ceremo-
nies etc, they will answer that they have been taught that way and 
that it is a mystery of the ancestors. Jensen also argues that, because of 
the natives' reasonableness in so called profane matters, we should 
entertain as a possibility the initial reasonableness of cultic acts. Being 
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passed on didactically, they may have lost their creative quality and 
comprehensibility in the ensuing situation of application. But also, he 
argues, religious activity cannot always be an object of rational under-
standing, because of its relation to such mysteries as life and death, 
which have been incomprehensible from the beginning and remain 
largely so today. Anyway, Jensen's argument seems to imply that "in-
comprehensibility" and separation from daily life are not inherent 
qualities of religion. 
   However, a reason for the conceptual separation of the sacred and 
the profane may be found in the continuity of the recent history of 
European Christianity. No reforms have been recorded during the 19 
th. century and the first  half' of the 20th. Towards the turn of the 
last century there has been a movement, within church institutes, 
though mostly unorganized, to work for a new orientation of catholi-
cism towards the world. This is known as  "modernism"17). Attempted 
at was the application of modern criticism to bible study and church 
history. Rome, however, radically condemned and suppressed the move-
ment. 
   The fact that the Catholic church has reacted with panic measures 
such as excommunication against what was only mordern learning, 
shows that the church must have been strongly embedded and embat-
tled in tradition. A similar situation also exsisted in the highly ritua-
lized liturgy, which was only modernized after the 1960's. Therefore, 
it is easily imagined that the 19th. and the first half of the 20th. cen-
tury was a time in which the religious "services" had become totally 
different from anything profane. This is further illustrated by the atti-
tudes of the priests towards their parishioners they spoke of as "souls" 
that had to be saved from "the world". The relation of this situation 
to our present interest is, that it have been scholars who lived in 
such a climate during the  19th. century, who began studying primitive 
religions in which they located the same fundamental differences 
between religion and non-religion. 
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    Actually, classic anthropology is being criticized in recent studiesm 
for perpetuating discriminating views between primitive times and 
modern societies, for the confusion of the sacred and the unclean , 
for considering ideas concerning pollution as primitive hygiene , for 
the opposition between ritual and spiritual religion, between the sacred 
and the profane. About the latter is mentioned that: A total opposition 
between the sacred and the profane seems to have been a necessary step 
in  Durkheim'  s theory of social integration. It expressed the opposition 
between the individual and society (p. 21). Further, especially Frazer 
is severely criticized and even blamed for isolating and hardening the 
idea of magic as the efficacious  symbol19)  . Magic , according to Frazer, 
resulted from early man's inability of distinguishing between his own 
subjective associations and external objective reality. Critique of this 
and similar views from early anthropology resembles the saying that 
beauty exists in the eye of the beholder. So possibly do conceptual 
problems. 
   Bringing our argument about the vitale relationship between sa-
cred and profane awareness to a close, we have to say that this re-
lation cannot be explained without connection to the question what 
religion and society is, or that of how individuals relate to society . 
We have to see how institutions come into being, how they are main-
tained, and how they change. We also have to consider how man is 
socialized into the ways of thinking and behavior in his society. Con-
sidering these things, we will find that religion like all other social 
reality is constructed  reality20). To summarise this view of society 
briefly, there is externalization of subjective experience in the setting 
of social interaction. There is habitualization of activities some of 
which become typified as roles. The process of institutionalization is 
completed when not only activities but also actors are typified . When 
habitualized and institutionalized patterns of behavior have been 
transmitted to the following generations, society takes on its full shape 
as objectivated reality. It is then that gradually a system of legitimation 
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evolves which will be largely responsible for the maintenance of the 
social fabric. 
   Durkheim has been much aware of the objectified social reality, 
represented by his  „collective consciousness" and expressed in his 
advice to treat social facts as  „things". But he seems to have given 
little thought to the creative processes of social interaction, so that 
he stressed the role of society over that of individual actors Here 
again, it may be noted that Durkheim is followed by Eliade who held 
a similar view. He stated : Religious man is not given, he makes himself 
by approaching divine  models21). No mention is made about the origin 
of these models. 
   All this is to say that the essence of a social institution must not 
be sought in its objectified appearance only. This means in the case 
of the sacred and the profane that, even if their opposition is the so-
cially-natural result of a certain development, it is not a necessary 
result. Since religion originally grows out of life situations, as Durk-
heim after all saw it and as was emphatically stated by Malinowskt, 
its origin should be sought in the human mind that seeks a solution 
to life's problems, or, in final analysis, in the endeavor of pinpointing 
the ultimate meaning of human existence. Religion in this sense is an 
added consciousness or an ideological orientation akin to other ideolo-
gical orientations that can be magical, philosophical, scientific, mater-
ialistic, hedonistic and what  not?22) 
    Within the religious frame of reference many combinations of 
sacred and profane awareness are possible. They range from total 
sacredness towards continuity and coexistence of both aspects or their 
opposition, towards the intensification of profane awareness and the 
evaporation of the sacred one. If this is right, we have to conclude that 
the twin concept of the sacred and the profane has indeed minimal 
cognitive or evaluative value, either religiously or culturally, especially 
because it easily conveys the idea of opposition, which is only an 
unqualified assession of one, possible way of relationship. 
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